Here, from Filip’s remarks, are the highlights of the new policy:

“First, credit for cooperation will not depend on whether a corporation has waived attorney-client privilege or work product protection, or produced materials protected by attorney-client or work-product protections. It will depend on the disclosure of facts. Corporations that timely disclose relevant facts may receive due credit for cooperation, regardless of whether they waive attorney-client privilege or work product protection in the process. Corporations that do not disclose relevant facts typically may not receive such credit, just like any other defendant”

“Second, prior Department policy allowed federal prosecutors to request, under certain conditions, that a corporation disclose non-factual attorney-client privileged communications and work product, such as legal advice. This is what the old guidelines designated “Category II” information, and it lies at the core of the attorney-client privilege and work product protection. The new policy forbids prosecutors from asking for such information, with only two exceptions, both of which are well-recognized in existing law.”

“Third, the new policy instructs prosecutors not to consider whether a corporation has advanced attorneys’ fees to its employees, officers, or directors when evaluating cooperativeness. Under the earlier guidance, the Department reserved the right to consider such payments negatively in deciding whether to assign cooperation credit to a corporation. That is no longer the case. A corporation’s payment of or advancement of attorneys’ fees to its employees will be relevant only in the rare situation where it, combined with other circumstances, would rise to the level of criminal obstruction of justice. This of course will generally not be the case.”

“Fourth, under the new policy, federal prosecutors may not consider whether the corporation has entered into a joint defense agreement in evaluating whether to give the corporation credit for cooperating. There are legitimate reasons why a business would choose to enter, or not enter, that kind of agreement. The government may, of course, ask that a corporation refrain from taking information the government provided it and disclosing that information to third parties. But the mere participation in a joint defense agreement by a corporation will not be taken into account for the purpose of evaluating cooperation.”

“Fifth, prior guidance allowed prosecutors to consider whether a corporation disciplined or terminated employees for the purpose of evaluating cooperation. That is now disallowed. Prosecutors may only consider whether a corporation has disciplined employees that the corporation identifies as culpable, and only for the purpose of evaluating the corporation’s remedial measures or compliance program.”

As a practical matter, what do prosecutors do when investigating a case where the target has asserted the attorney-reliance defense before the indictment is returned? Often, the prosecutor will be able to satisfy (or convince) himself ahead of time that the attorney was not told the whole story by his client or that the attorney did not give the advice asserted by the target. But some prosecutors solve the problem by indicting the attorney along with the client. This is obviously unfair and improper if the attorney was sincere in giving advice–even mistaken advice. On the other hand, there are definitely occasions in which an attorney knowingly aids and abets a crime by providing “advice” to the principal that is really nothing more than a cover for fraud. This seems to happen a lot in connection with alleged tax shelter schemes.

Why am I even thinking and talking about this stuff? The whole attorney reliance issue came to mind yesterday when I read the Washington Post story on the latest John C. Yoo memo to surface. Yoo is the former Deputy Assistant Attorney General in DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel, infamous for writing a memo providing legal cover for the mistreatment and/or torture of enemy combatants.

The government has now declassified a sentence from another Yoo memo, penned in 2001. This memo relates to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (”FISA”). FISA states that FISA is the “exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . and the interception of domestic wire, oral and electronic communications may be conducted.” The Bush Administration wanted to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance without even post-surveillance judicial authorization in certain situations, which is prohibited by FISA. FISA allows emergency warrantless eavesdropping, but requires the government to obtain post-surveillance judicial approval withinn 72 hours of the electronic surveillance. That wasn’t good enough for the Bush Administration. Yoo’s declassified sentence states that: “Unless Congress made a clear statement in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that it sought to restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless searches in the national security area — which it has not — then the statute must be construed to avoid [such] a reading.”

In other words, even though FISA says on its face that it is the “exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . and the interception of domestic wire, oral and electronic communications may be conducted,” Congress really meant to carve out an exception for the inherent Presidential authority to conduct such surveillance and interception. Not only is this analysis false and Orwellian–it doesn’t even make sense as a matter of Constitutional Law. If the President has this inherent authority, it is Constitutional in nature, and cannot be restricted by Congressional enactment.

Predictably, Senator Diane Feinstein is outraged and calls for new FISA legislation with even stronger exclusivity language. But respect for the English language, including the plain language of statutes, has never been a strong suit of the Bush Administration. Senator, and former federal prosecutor, Sheldon Whitehouse, is more to the point: “I cannot reconcile the plain language of FISA that it is the exclusive procedure for electronic surveillance of Americans with the OLC opinion saying Congress didn’t say that. Once again, behind the veil of secrecy, OLC appears to have cooked up extravagant or misguided legal theories which would never survive the light of day.” Translation: Yoo is no better than a tax attorney handing out phony opinion letters to justify a fraudulent off-shore tax fraud scheme.

Brian A. Benczkowski, DOJ’s Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legislative Affairs, said that the government no longer relies on the 2001 Yoo memo to justify its warrantless electronic surveillance. Benczkowski, like former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales before him, believes that when Congress approved the September 18, 2001, Authorization for Use of Military Force, it “confirmed and supplemented the President’s Article II authority to conduct warrantless surveillance to prevent catastrophic attacks on the United States.” Almost nobody in Washington involved in the passage of the Authorization really believes this.

So here is my question: If the Obama Administration decides to criminally prosecute members of the Bush Administration for their knowing violation of FISA, will Yoo be a witness for the government, a witness for the defense, or a co-defendant?